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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
MARVIN WHITTENBACK and 
JOHN JOSEPH PARRETT, Case No. 16575 
and 16738 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants were charged with the crime of Theft, a 
Felony of the Third Degree, in violation of Sections 76-6-40 
and 76-6-412, Utah Code Annotated (as amended), in that on 
or about the 26th day of March, 1979, they exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another with inten 
to deprive that other of his property, such property being o 
a value of more than $250.00 but not more than $1,000.00. 
BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At approximately 1:00 A.M. of the day in ~uestion, 
Officer Geslison of the Provo City Police Department observa 
two individuals inside an all-night coin-operatej laundry 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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in the City of Provo. Recognizing the individuals from 
prior contacts and knowing that they were not local resi-
dents (R. 41:15), he concluded without more that they might 
be in the act of robbing the laundry. The officer entered 
the premises to question the suspects and observed that 
the appellant Wh.:ittenback was sitting in a chair near the 
entrance and that the appellant Parrett was standing near 
a clothes-dryer in which several pairs of pants were being 
dried (R.40:14). They were in substantially the same 
positions as when he saw them from his patrol car, and 
had done nothing since he had first noticed them. (R. 40:30-
41: 4). 
The officer began to question the appellants. Both 
answered that they were merely doing their laundry (R. 41:24-
30). As the questioning continued, two other officers, 
Officers Mock and Latham, arrived in response to Officer 
Geslison's request for aid. One of the officers asked 
whether they could search the appellants' car, which was 
parked outside, and appellant Parrett, the owner of the car, 
gave his permission. (R. 42:27-43:4). 
As Officers Mock and Latham conducted the search of 
the car, Officer Geslison ordered the appellants to empty 
their pockets (R.43:10-12). He had noticed that appellant 
Whittenback's pockets were bulging perceptibly, and on that 
basis demanded the search (R.43:14). Though neither of the 
appellants had been placed under official arrest at that 
-2-
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time, Parrett complied with the order, producing a ring 
of keys; Whittenback, however, refused to empty his pockets 
and demanded to know by what authority the officer could 
make such a demand. The officer asserted that he had the 
authority to search their pockets, and Whittenback there-
after moved to a table and emptied a large quantity of 
coins from his pockets. Officer Geslison then quickly 
patted down the clothing that appellant Whittenback was 
wearing, as part of the search. 
At roughly the same time, Officer Mock, having dis-
covered burglary tools in his search of the appellants' 
car, returned into the laundry and placed the appellants 
under arrest for possession of burglary tools (R.60:24; 
65:19). The contents of the car were then inventoried at 
the scene (R.67:21). 
The owner of the laundry examined the machines on the 
premises to determine whether any of their contents had 
been stolen. Fourteen machines had had their cash boxes 
emptied (R.15: 18-24) but there was no record of what quanti: 
of coins had been in them prior to that time. It was durin1 
the following several days that the owner examined the 
contents of the other machines on the premises to deter-
mine, by comparison, how much money may have been in those 
which were empty (R.16:27; 23:22). At trial, the owner 
testified that different machines hold different amounts of 
-3-
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money at different times of the year (R.26:3-15; 26:23-
27:6), and that because he kept no accurate records of 
their contents and did not account for their proceeds on 
any regular basis, he could only guess as to the amount of 
money that may have been missing (R.24:11; 32:24-33:3). 
He testified that it was his estimate that $600 to $800 was 
missing. 
Prior to trial, appellants moved to suppress all the 
items of evidence found in their pockets and in their car, 
which motion was denied at the close of trial. Appellants 
also moved for dismissal on the grounds of the State's 
failure to offer substantial evidence on the issue of 
value, but that motion was denied, as was their motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellants were tried in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court of Utah County, the Honorable George E. Ballif pre-
siding, on the 29th day of March, 1979. On the basis of 
the denials of appellants' motions and the verdict of the 
jury, appellants were adjudged guilty of the charges against 
them. Appellant Whittenback was sentenced on the 29th day 
of June, 1979, and appellant Parrett on the 12th day of 
October, 1979. Notice of appeal was timely filed by both 
appellants, and their cases were joined for the purposes of 
this appeal on the 30th day of October, 1979. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants respectfully request that the Court 
reverse the decision of the District Court denying their 
Motion to Suppress and enter an order requiring that all 
evidence produced as a result of the appellants' detention 
be suppressed. Appellants also request, in the alternative 
that the court reverse the decision of the District Court 
denying their Motions for Directed Verdict and Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict and enter an order granting 
them a judgment of innocence. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DETENTION AND QUESTIONING OF THE APPELLANTS WAS A 
VIOLATION OF THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ALL EVIDENCE 
OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF THAT DETENTION AND QUESTIONING 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion provides, in part, that: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated . 
It is undisputed that the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment apply to a wide variety of situations in which 
law enforcement officers confront individuals for the 
purpose of investigating criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968): Adams 
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V. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 
(1972). Whether the stopping and questioning of a person 
in a public place constitutes a search or seizure of his 
person for the purposes of the Amendment, and whether it 
is reasonable or unreasonable under the circumstances, are 
questions which are dealt with by the courts almost as 
often as they are confronted by the police. A number of 
clear principles have become established by the decisions 
of the courts which demonstrate under what circumstances 
the police may lawfully, without a warrant, approach an 
individual whom they suspect of criminal activity and 
initiate an interrogation. Appellants submit that under the 
facts of this case, the police violated those principles 
and were not justified in approaching the appellants and 
questioning them concerning their presence in the laundry, 
and that as a result of that unlawful conduct of the police, 
all evidence obtained in the ensuing events should have 
been excluded from the trial. 
In Terry v. Ohio, an officer of the Cleveland police 
department was serving in a plainclothes capacity and 
observed two persons who attracted his closer attention. 
The persons were standing on a corner, and while the officer 
watched, one and then the other left the corner and walked 
some distance down the street and returned, pausing momen-
tarily both ways to stop and look into a particular store 
window. They repeated the procedure five or six times each. 
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The officer concluded that they might be casing the store 
for a robbery, and he approached them to ask some question: 
In the following interchange, he frisked the individuals 
for weapons. 
The Supreme Court's opinion in the case deals prima~ 
with the issue whether the limited pat-down search for 
weapons, not based upon a warrant nor upon probable cause 
sufficient to arrest, was justified. It specifically 
reserved the question, under what circumstances an officer 
is justified in approaching a suspicious person for the 
purpose of questioning. See opinion, note 16. However, 
its statements concerning the scope and effect of the Fourt 
Amendment are applicable to such a question, and since that 
is the crucial question in this case, it is valuable to 
discuss the opinion here. 
In regard to any intrusion upon the privacy of an 
individual, the court stated: 
[I)n justifying the particular intrusion the polio 
officer must be able to point to s cific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 
warrant that intrusion. Anything less would invit 
intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights 
based on nothing more substantial than inarticu-
lable hunches, a result this court has consistent~ 
refused to sanction. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. 
The court rejected the proposition that the good faith of 
the officer would be sufficient to limit the effect of the 
intrusion. Even under such a circumstance, the individual 
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might perceive the conduct of the police as harrassment 
or as a violation of his privacy. 
Under our decisions, courts still retain their 
traditional responsibility to guard against 
police conduct which is overbearing or harrassing, 
or which trenches upon personal security without 
the objective evidentiary justification which the 
constitution requires. When such conduct is iden-
tified, it must be condemned by the judiciary and 
its fruits must be excluded from evidence in 
criminal trials. Id. at 15. 
Although the persons questioned in Terry were not detained 
in their homes or in any other place where they would 
normally expect "privacy," the court held that their brief 
detention and questioning constituted a seizure for the 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment: 
[W]herever an individual may harbor a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, [cite omitted], he is 
entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusions. . Unquestionably petitioner was 
entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment as he walked down the street in Cleveland. 
* * * It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment 
governs "seizures" of the person which do not 
eventuate in a trip to the station house and 
prosecution for a crime--"arrests" in traditional 
terminology. It must be recognized that whenever 
a police officer accosts an individual and restrains 
his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that 
person. Id. 9, 14. 
Appellants submit that the conduct of the officers in this 
case constituted such a seizure, and that since the police 
could point to no articulable facts which justified their 
belief that a crime was in progress, that seizure was 
unjustified. Testimony at the hearing on the motion to 
suppress and at trial indicated that Officer Geslison knew 
-8-
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nothing more than that the two individuals were in an all-
night establishment doing their laundry, that they were 
from out-of-town, and that the hour was late. None of the~ 
facts singly nor together gives rise to a justifiable sus-
picion that the defendants were engaging in any criminal 
activity. The officer therefore acted unlawfully in 
approaching the appellants and interrogating them. For thE 
purpose of argument, the facts that their car was subjected 
to a search and that they were compelled to empty their 
pockets all before formal arrest were sufficient to show 
that that freedom to leave was restrained. 
A number of recent cases lend support to the appella~ 
argument, under similar factual circumstances. In In re 
Tony C., 582 P.2d 957 (Calif. 1978), the California Supreme 
Court considered a case in which a police officer was on 
patrol in a residential area of La Puente, California durin 
school hours. He noticed two black youths walking along 
the sidewalk, both about 13 years of age. He made a turn 
and drove by them again, and saw one standing on a corner, 
but could not see the other. He drove on and made another 
turn to come back, and this time saw both of them again. 
The officer pulled over, stopped the youths, and began to 
question them about their identities and reason for being 
in the area. His interrogation led to the arrest of the 
defendant, one of the youths. 
-9-
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The court first concluded that the defendant was 
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection at the time he was 
stopped. It stated: 
Because of the limited scope of that invasion 
in the present context, it need not be supported 
by the actual belief in guilt required to arrest, 
book, and jail an individual on a named criminal 
charge. Yet the interest at stake is far 
from insignificant: it is the right of every 
person to enjoy the use of public streets, buil-
dings, parks, and other conveniences without 
unwarranted interference or harrassment by agents 
of the law. * * * Balancing these factors, the 
courts have concluded that in order to justify 
an investigative stop or detention, the circum-
stances known or apparent to the officer must 
include specific and articulable facts causing 
him to suspect that (1) some activity relating to 
crime has taken place or is occurring or about to 
occur, and (2) the person he intends to stop or 
detain is involved in that activity. Not only 
must he subjectively entertain such a suspicion, 
but it must be objectively reasonable for him to 
do so: the facts must be such as would cause any 
reasonable police officer in a like position, 
drawing when appropriate on his training and 
experience . . to suspect the same criminal 
activity and the same involvement by the person 
in question. The corollary to this rule, of 
course, is that an investigative stop or deten-
tion predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch 
is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting 
in complete good faith. (Terry v. Ohio, supra, 
392 U.S. at p.22, 88 S.Ct. 1868) 582 P.2d at 959. 
The court noted that the word "detention" is subject to a 
wide variety of constructions, and that police conduct which 
merely constitutes "contact" with persons requires no justi-
fication at all. However, the court rejected the use of the 
test by which a "detention" for Fourth Amendment purposes 
results when a person is not free to walk away from the 
-10-
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encounter, since the subtleties of the situation often make 
it impossible for the court, by hindsight, to determine 
whether the victim of the arrest was actually detained or 
only believed that he was. Instead, the court ruled that 
a "detention" falls under the protection of the Amendment 
whenever the police accost an individual whom they suspect 
to be involved in criminal activity. The court stated: 
A more fruitful approach focuses on the purpose 
of the intrusion itself. If the individual is 
stopped or detained because the officer suspects 
he may be personally involved in some criminal 
activity, his Fourth Amendment rights are impli-
cated and he is entitled to the safeguards of the 
rule set forth above. 
WWW 
Finding that the officer in that case had stopped the def~ 
dant for the very purpose of investigating the defendant's 
suspected criminal activity, the court held that the Fourtl 
Amendment test would apply, even though the questioning 
took place openly on a public sidewalk. Furthermore, the 
court held that the officer could not point to specific 
facts which justified the approach of the defendant and his 
questioning. The fact that two youths were walking on the 
sidewalk during school .hours was easily explaina~le in 
terms of a number of innocent activities. The fact that 
there had been several burglaries in the area and that thre 
male blacks were being sought for arrest had nothing to do 
with the defendant and his companion, who could not at firs 
":\ sight be identified in any way with those burglaries. 
day-old burglary report does not transform a residential 
-11-
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neighborhood into a no-man's land in which any passerby is 
fair game for a roving police interrogation." Even the 
fact that the two youths parted company in a suspicious 
manner did not justify their questioning. The court said: 
In short, viewed either singly or collectively, 
the circumstances known to [the officer] did not 
support a reasonable suspicion that Tony and his 
companion were involved in criminal activity when 
he observed them walking along the sidewalk. 
582 P.2d at 963. 
The stop and questioning of the defendant was therefore 
unlawful, though otherwise innocent and in good faith, and 
all knowledge obtained as a result of that conduct was 
inadmissible in court. Specifically, when another officer 
was called to the scene and recognized Tony as a suspect 
wanted on a warrant, the evidence found when he was searched 
after his arrest was inadmissible. Though his identification 
by the other officer did not itself require Fourth Amend-
rnent justification, its fruits were inadmissible because 
the defendant's initial stopping and questioning was illegal. 
An almost identical case was decided in the same 
fashion by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United 
States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1971). There, 
an officer in Missouri observed a black male sitting at the 
wheel of a new Cadillac parked in front of a pool hall. 
While he watched, another black male emerged from the pool 
hall and entered the car on thE passenger side. Noting 
that the car had Nevada license plates, the officers 
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approached the individuals to question them about the 
license plates and about their purpose for being in the 
area. When one man rolled down the window of the car, the 
officer immediately smelled marijuana and placed the men 
under arrest. 
Concluding first that the conduct of the officers 
constituted a "seizure'' for the purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment, the court stated: 
[T]he police action here amounted to a "seizure" 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment as 
interpreted by Terry and Carpenter. Even though 
Nicholas may have been physically free to drive 
away when the officers stationed themselves on 
either side of Nicholas' car and flashed their 
badges, we find that the actions of the officers 
constituted sufficient show of authority to 
restrain Nicholas' freedom of movement. 
The court then addressed the issue, reserved in Terry, 
[N]amely, whether an investigative "seizure" for 
less than probable cause, for purposes of 
"detention" and/or interrogation is constitution-
ally permissible. 448 F.2d at 623. 
The court conceded at first that if the police acted unlaw· 
fully in detaining the defendant for the purpose of ques-
tioning, then the fruits of that detention, the evidence 
of the marijuana, would be inadmissible, even though its 
discovery could be justified otherwise on the doctrine of 
consent (in that the defendant voluntarily rolled down the 
window) or the doctrine of plain view (i.e., plain smell). 
The government contended that police are authorized in 
momentarily detaining individuals for the purpose of ques-
tioning on less than probable cause. The court answered: 
-13-
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In light of these facts, we think that, at best, 
the police were acting upon a generalized sus-
picion that any black person driving an auto with 
out-of-state license plates might be engaged in 
criminal activity. The momentary detention of a 
citizen for questioning is not permitted on such 
scant basis. Id. at 625. 
Thus, the court held that though questioning on less than 
probable cause may be permissible in some circumstances, it 
was not here, where police could not affirm that they were 
investigating any particular crime, that they had any 
information concerning the defendants or their car, that 
there was any indication of an actual crime in progress, 
or that there was anything else which pointed substantially 
to the existence of criminal activity. 
The same reasoning, always drawn from the opinion in 
the Terry case, runs through a number of similar cases. 
In United States v. Robinson, 535 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1976), 
police officers stopped their car beside another car which 
was parked by the road, thinking that it contained two 
detectives whom they were waiting to meet. Seeing, instead, 
that the car contained two black men, the police concluded 
that it was the wrong car. But rather than drive on, they 
approached the men to question them. The court held that 
such conduct by the police was unlawful. They knew only 
that the car had been driving slowly, that it was a new 
car in a poor neighborhood, and that it looked like an 
unmarked police car. The court stated: 
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In the instant case, the facts known to the offi0 
at the time he stopped the defendant clearly did 
not rise to the required level, and in reality 
were so tenuous as to provide virtually no groun& 
whatsoever for suspicion ... In short, the 
officer simply stopped two black males because 
they were in a black Chevrolet. This fact alone 
without additional reliable evidence sufficient ' 
to warrant the conclusion that either or both of 
the men had been or were involved in criminal 
activity did not constitute cause to stop the 
vehicle. 
Similarly, in United States v. Mallides, 473 F. 2d 859 (9t 
Cir. 1973), a reversal resulted on a showing that an offi0 
had stopped for questioning a car occupied by six Mexican-
looking men who sat upright and did not turn to look at h~ 
car as he drove by. On the reasoning of Terry, the court 
held the stop of the car unlawful, and also concluded that 
because the stop was unlawful, the search of the car's 
trunk, though conducted with the consent of the driver, wa: 
also unlawful and the evidence found therein was excludab1 
The Terry rationale was also the basis of the decision of 
the Sixth Circuit in Riccardi v. Perini, 417 F.2d 645 (6th 
Cir. 1969), where officers merely observed a car traveling 
slowly through an area where burglaries had recently 
occurred and stopped the driver for questioning. The 
court held that the stop was unlawful and the fruits ther~ 
inadmissible. 
The Tenth Circuit applies the same rule as the cases 
cited above. In United States v. McDevitt, 508 F.2d 8 (l~ 
Cir. 1974), an officer stopped a truck on the highway in 
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order to determine whether it was carrying goods for hire 
in violation of a New Mexico statute. The driver's papers 
were in order, but rather than release the truck, the 
officer continued investigating and finally learned that 
the driver was wanted on a military warrant and was in 
possession of marijuana. In overturning his conviction 
and ruling that all the evidence should have been excluded 
which resulted from the encounter, the court stated: 
In order for an officer to stop and search a 
vehicle there must exist some basis for suspicion, 
at least, that the driver has violated the law, 
even though the facts need not be sufficient to 
establish probable cause . . In the case at 
bar, there was no probable cause or even reason-
able suspicion to justify the stop. 508 F.2d at 
10, 11. 
See also United States v. Fallon, 457 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 
1972). Both cases relied upon Terry and the rules appli-
cable to seizure of persons for their rationale. 
The rule is therefore well established, following the 
Terry decision, that police officers must be able to point 
to specific, articulable facts which justify a reasonable 
belief that criminal activity is in progress before they 
may approach for questioning any person who is suspected 
of being involved in such activity. If the police accost 
a person without first obtaining a knowledge of sufficient 
facts, any evidence obtained as a result of that encounter 
is inadmissible, disregarding the fact that it would other-
wise be justified by some other exception to the warrant 
requirement, such as consent, plain view, search incident 
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to arrest , or probable cause with exigent circumstances. 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 
L. Ed. 2 d 4 41 ( 19 6 3 ) . 
Appellants assert that in the case at bar, the 
police were unable to point to any specific facts which 
justified them in approaching the appellants or detaining 
them for the purpose of interrogation. Before the conduct 
in question, the police knew only that the appellants were 
from out-of-town, that they were in an all-night estab-
lishment late at night, and that they were doing their 
laundry. These facts gave the police no reasonable justi-
fication for questioning the appellants, and such questim 
when it was for the purpose of determining whether the 
appellants themselves were involved in criminal activity, 
was unlawful. Therefore, all evidence produced as a resul 
of that initial encounter was tainted by the illegality o: 
the police conduct and should have been excluded. 
II. THE SEARCH OF APPELLANTS' CLOTHING WAS UNLAWFUL, AND 
THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN THEIR POCKETS 7HEREFORE SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED. 
In the alternative, assuming that the police did 
have a reasonable basis for questioning the appellants, th 
search of their pockets on less than probable cause was 
unlawful. Under the circumstances of this case, there arE 
only two possible grounds for sustaining the search of the 
appellants' pockets, at a time when they were ~at under 
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arrest but were acting under the authority of the officer. 
Either the officer had probable cause to arrest the appel-
lants, and therefore could search them pursuant to their 
arrest even though the arrest followed the search, or, 
lacking probable cause to arrest, the officer was nonethe-
less justified in conducting a limited search under certain 
circumstances. 
Facts supporting the argument that the officer had 
probable cause to arrest the appellants do not appear in 
this case. In Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct.223, 13 
L.Ed.2d 142 (1964), the United States Supreme Court articu-
lated the test applicable to determine whether officers have 
probable cause to arrest without a warrant. The same test 
applies to searches conducted substantially at the same 
time as the arrest. The court stated: 
Whether that arrest was constitutionally valid 
depends in turn upon whether, at the moment the 
arrest was made, the officers had probable cause 
to make it--whether at the moment the facts and 
circumstances within their knowledge and of 
which they had reasonably trustworthy infor-
mation were sufficient to warrant a prudent man 
in believing that the petitioner had committed 
or was committing an offense. 
In the present case, it is clear from a perusal of the 
testimony that there was not sufficient evidence in the 
officer's knowledge at the time of the search of the appel-
lants to constitute probable cause to arrest them, and the 
same circumstance leads to the conclusion that the officer 
was not justified by probable cause in searching their persons. 
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Howeve:c, Terry v. Ohio, supra, recognized that unde 
certain circumstances officers may make limited searches 
of the persons of susFects even though probable cause to 
arrest is lacking. Balancing the rights of the individuai 
to be free from unnecessary and unreasonable intrusions 
upon his person against the need of the officer to ascer-
tain whether the suspect is armed and dangerous to his or 
anyone else's safety, the court concluded that police 
officers, even in the absence of probable cause, may con-
duct limited searches of the persons of suspects in order 
to discover weapons. The court stated: 
Our evaluation of the proper balance that has 
to be struck in this type of case leads us to 
conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn 
authority to permit a reasonable search for 
weapons for the protection of the police officer 
wrere re has reason to believe that he is dealing 
with an armed and dangerous individual for a 
crime. The officer need not be absolutely 
certain that the individual is armed; the issue 
is whether a reasonably prudent man in the cir-
cumstances would be warranted in the belief 
that his safety or that of others was in danger. 
The justification for searches allowed by Terry is limitei 
however, to searches for weapons, and does not extend to 
searches for evidence or other contraband. The court adde 
Suffice it to note that such a search, unlike 
a search without a warrant incident to a lawful 
arrest, is not justified by any need to prevent 
the disappearance or destruction of evidence 
of crime. See Preston v. United States, 376 
U.S. 364, 367, 84 S.Ct. 881, 883, 18 L.Ed.2d 
777 (1964). 
Furthermore, the courts have not, in the time since Terry, 
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extended the rule of Terry to allow searches on less than 
probable cause for anything other than weapons. 
Therefore, appellants argue that on the facts of 
this case, the police officer who questioned them, regard-
less of whether that questioning was lawful or unlawful, 
had no justification for ordering them to empty their 
pockets. His action in doing so and in patting down their 
outer clothing constituted a search without warrant and 
without probable cause, and was unlawful. The evidence 
obtained from their pockets therefore should have been 
excluded. 
III. THE SEARCH OF THE APPELLANTS' CAR WAS WITHOUT A 
WARRANT AND WAS NOT JUSTIFIED UNDER ANY OF THE 
ESTABLISHED EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT. 
THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE CAR THEREFORE SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN SUPPRESSED. 
Appellants noted above that the search of the car 
would, under their first argument, be a product of the 
illegal questioning and detention of the appellants. As 
such, the fruits of that search would be inadmissible. 
In the alternative, appellants argue that on the 
general principles of the Fourth Amendment, the search 
cannot be justified under the circumstances of this case. 
The Fourth Amendment requires that all searches be accom-
panied by a warrant, unless they can be supported by one 
of the well recognized exceptions to the warrant require-
ment. Here, none of those exceptions is applicable. 
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Under very similar facts, the United States Supreme Court 
in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 
29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) held that the search of an arrestee' 
car which was parked in his driveway at the time he was 
arrested could not be justified under the Fourth Amendment 
Here, as in that case, the police did not have probable 
cause to search the car, nor were there exigent circum-
stances which threatened the imminent removal or destruc-
tion of evidence, so that the probable cause exception 
would not apply. Coolidge, supra. Nor would the so-
called automobile exception apply, for the reasons stated 
in Coolidge. Similarly, the plain view exception is 
irrelevant on the facts of this case, since it requires 
that the officer encounter evidence inadvertently, not 
as a result of a search. Coolidge, supra. The only 
exception upon which the state might rely is the excep-
tion allowing a search pursuant to consent given by the 
owner of the property. Appellants submit that the search 
of the car in this case was not based upon a voluntary 
consent. 
In the case of Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 
218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed.2d 854 (1973), the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed that the guiding principle in the area 
of consentual searches is that in order for the search to 
be valid, the consent must be freely and voluntarily givm 
The court applied a "totality of the circumstances'' test 
-21-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and held that certain factors weigh heavily against a 
finding of consent. It stated: 
(I]f under all the circumstances it has appeared 
that the consent was not given voluntarily--
that it was coerced by threats or force, or 
granted only in submission to a claim of law-
ful authority,--then we have found the consent 
invalid and the search unreasonable. 
Appellants claim that under the circumstances of this 
case, the consent given to search the car was coerced and 
granted only in submission to the police officers' show 
of authority, and was therefore invalid and the search 
was non-consentual and unlawful. 
A number of cases support the proposition that 
where the police obtain consent to search by asserting 
a false claim of authority, the consent must be found to 
be involuntary. In Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 
543, 412 U.S. 218, 93 s.ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed.2d 854 (1973), 
officers went to the home of a suspect and informed the 
suspect's grandmother, who met them at the door, that 
they had a warrant to search the house for the suspect. 
In fact, they did not have a warrant. The state, at a 
hearing on a motion to suppress the fruits of the search, 
therefore attempted to justify the search on the grounds 
that the grandmother allowed the officers to enter and 
thereby consented to the search. The court held against 
the government, on the ground that a false claim of 
authority vitiates consent. The burden is on the party 
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seeking to prove consent to show that it was freely and 
voluntarily given, and such burden was not met where the 
consent followed a false claim of authority to search by 
police. 
Some courts apply a rule which requires that 
consent obtained after any illegal act of the police is 
per se involuntary. In Taylor v. State, 355 So.2d 180 
(Dist.Ct.App.Fla. 1978) the Florida appeals court stated: 
Some broad trends are discernible in the cases. 
One of those broad trends is that any serious 
illegal actions by a law enforcement officer, 
such as an illegal arrest, almost always renders 
involuntary any subsequent consent to search 
given by the victim of the illegal action . . 
The only exception recognized by the cases in 
which a prior illegal arrest or search would 
not render a subsequent consent, confession, or 
admission involuntary is where there has been 
a clear and unequivocal break in the chain of 
illegality sufficient to dissipate the taint 
of the prior illegal action. 355 So.2d at 184. 
Thus, many courts would recognize the rule that an illegal 
arrest would vitiate a later consentual search unless some 
event or influence intervened between the illegal arrest 
and the consent, to cure the taint of the illegal act. 
Other courts do not accept the per se rule render· 
ing consent involuntary whenever an illegal arrest precede 
the consent, but rather grant great weight to the fact 
that an illegal act has occurred in determining whether, 
on the basis of all the circumstances, the consent was 
voluntary. In United States v. Bazinet, 462 F.2d 982 (8th 
Cir. 1972), the Eight Circuit stated: 
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The mere fact that a person has been arrested 
in violation of his constitutional rights casts 
grave doubt upon the voluntariness of a sub-
sequent consent. The government has a heavy 
burden of proof in establishing that the consent 
was the voluntary act of the arrestee and that 
it was not the fruit of the illegal arrest. 
Similarly, in United States v. Watson, 504 F.2d 849 (9th 
Cir. 1974) the Ninth Circuit held that such factors as 
the prior arrest of the appellant, the illegality of that 
arrest, and the failure of the police to inform the appel-
lant that he had a right to deny consent to search were 
significant and weighty arguments for the contention that 
his later consent to a search was involuntary. Since the 
arrest in that case was ultimately found to be legal, and 
the consent therefore voluntary, the Ninth Circuit decision 
illustrates the importance of whether the consenting party 
is in custody lawfully at the time of his consent. 
The same rule is followed in the Third Circuit, 
which stated in United States v. Molt, 589 F.2d 1247 
(3d Cir. 1978): 
When evidence exists to show the opposite--that 
a defendant believed he must consent--such evi-
dence weighs heavily against a finding that con-
sent was voluntarily given. And when that belief 
sterns directly from misrepresentations by govern-
ment officials, however innocently made, we 
deem the consent even more questionable. 589 
F.2d at 1251-1252. 
Appellants submit that the circumstances of this 
case show that their consent to the search of the car was 
a product of the illegal actions of the officers and of 
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their false show of authority. Their argument above 
demonstrates that the initial contact of the appellants 
by the police was a violation of their constitutional 
rights. While they were unlawfully detained and questioni 
in disregard of their rights, two more officers arrived 
on the scene to aid Officer Geslison in conducting the 
"investigation." The illegal detention, coupled with t~ 
reinforcement of the investigating officer by more office: 
together with all other circumstances surrounding the 
encounte~ raise a heavy presumption that the consent to 
search the car was not freely and voluntarily given. 
Appellants contend that the District Court failed to ta~ 
note of this presumption. 
Even if the detention and questioning of the appe: 
lants were found to be lawful, the same rules concerning 
the voluntariness of their consent to search would apply, 
with the same result. Where a suspect is in custody, the 
courts have held that there is a strong inference that hD 
consent to a search is not voluntary. In Oliver v. Bowen: 
386 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1967), where a suspect was sub-
jected to a search of his person and then placed under 
arrest, after which he gave consent to search his apart-
ment, the court stated: 
Equally was there basis for the court to regard 
the search made thereafter of Bowens' apartment 
as not being satisfying of a voluntary consent 
with the impact inherent from the official aut~ 
ority exercised over him, in having made a 
search of his person without expressed consent; 
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in having placed him under arrest and put 
~andcuffs on him; and in pressing him in 
impl1cat1onal follow-up with whether "he 
minded if we took a look," when he had just 
declared to them that there was nothing in 
the apartment to conceal. 386 F.2d at 691. 
See also U.S. v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973); 
U.S. v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966). 
Appellants therefore submit that where they were 
already in custody and subject to a coersive show of 
authority by the police officers, and especially where 
their interrogation was unlawful, the consent to search 
the car was not voluntary, and the search of the car was 
unlawful. 
IV. BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO OFFER SUBSTANTIAL, 
COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY 
ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN, THE STATE FAILED TO 
ESTABLISH ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME: AND THE 
APPELLANTS WERE THEREFORE ENTITLED TO A DISMISSAL. 
Section 76-1-501 of the Utah Criminal Code states: 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is 
presumed to be innocent until each element of 
the offense charged against him is proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such 
proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
One of the elements of the offense in the present case 
was that the value of the property alleged to have been 
taken was between $250.00 and $1,000.00. That element, 
along with all the other elements of the offense, was 
required to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, before 
the appellants could be found guilty of the charges against 
them. Appellants submit that such element was not proven 
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beyond a reasonable doubt and that there was such a lack 
of evidence on that issue that the court should have 
granted either the appellants' motion to dismiss or their 
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
The test on appellate review of the sufficiency 
of evidence to prove an essential element of an offense 
has been stated by a number of cases in Utah. In State 
v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
[T]he weight of evidence and credibility of 
witnesses are reserved exclusively for jury 
and reviewing court will not interfere unless 
evidence is found to be so lacking and insub-
stantial that reasonable men could not possibly 
have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable dou~ 
Similarly, in State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976), 
the court asserted: 
This court has long upheld the standard that 
on appeal from conviction the court cannot 
weigh the evidence nor say what quantum is 
necessary to establish a fact beyond a reason-
able doubt so long as the evidence given is 
substantial. 
The fact that the judgment notwithstanding the verdict is 
subject to the same rules as the motion to dismiss or to 
render a directed verdict is confirmed by the case of 
Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967), in 
which the court held: 
The trial court's action in granting the post-
verdict motion pursuant to Rule 50(b) Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is corrunonly referred 
to as one for judgment notwithstanding the 
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verdict. In passing on such motion, the 
court is governed by the same rules as it is 
when passing upon a motion for a directed 
verdict. In other words, the trial court can 
enter the judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
only for one reason, the absence of any sub-
stantial evidence to support the verdict. 
Therefore, if the court determines that there was not 
substantial evidence in this case on the question of the 
value of the property allegedly stolen, it is the duty of 
the appellate court to reverse the conviction. 
·In cases of larceny, the general rule applied to 
the determination of the value of the property stolen is 
that for the purposes of the criminal law, the value of 
the property is its fair market value at the time the prop-
erty was taken. State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977). 
On the question of fair market value, only evidence having 
a substantial relation to the fair market value at the 
time and place the theft occurred is relevant and admissible; 
and numerous decisions in the courts have held that evidence 
of value by any other method of valuation is incompetent 
and inadmissible. For example, in People v. Latham, 110 
P.2d 101 (Ct.App.Calif. 1941), evidence of the replacement 
value of stolen machines was held to have been inadmissible 
on the question of the value of the machines for the pur-
poses of the theft statute. In State v. Gallegos, 312 
P.2d 1067 (N.M. 1957), evidence of the original cost of a 
plow and of its replacement cost were held inadmissible 
on the question of fair market value for the purposes of 
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criminal law. Similarly, in People v. Paris, 511 P.2d 
393 (Colo. 1973), the court stated: 
While an owner of goods is always competent 
to testify as to the value of his property, 
it must, as we have said, relate to its value 
at the time of thecornrnission of the crime. 
Where, as here, the owner testifies only as to 
the purchase price of the goods, such testimony 
is competent evidence of fair market value only 
where the goods are so new, and thus have 
depreciated in value so insubstantially, as to 
allow a reasonable inference that the purchase 
price is comparable to current fair market val~ 
Finding that the purchase price testified to by the owner 
was not substantially equatable with fair market value, 
the court held the owner's testimony inadmissible and 
stated: 
Without competent evidence of fair market value 
the jury would have had to base its determinati 
of the value of the goods in question at the 
critical time on pure speculation. 
Although the property involved in this case was 
cash and not some other kind of goods having an independe: 
market value, the same principles governing the reliabili 
and admissibility of testimony concerning valuation shou~ 
be followed here. The cases cited above establish the 
principle that when the issue concerns fair market value, 
evidence derived by other methods of valuation is not 
allowed because of the likelihood that the jury will be 
misled and that the actual value of the property will be 
misconceived. Unless the alternate method of valuation 
actually closely approximates the fair market valuation 
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under the circumstances, the testimony based upon that 
alternate method will be irrelevant and immaterial. The 
objective of such a principle is that where the property 
is of a type capable of close valuation, the evidence 
must be precisely related to that valuation. 
In this case, the evidence presented on the issue 
of the value of the property taken was vague, imprecise, 
and speculative at best. The owner of the laundry 
testified that he examined the machines and determined 
which of them had been emptied of money. However, he 
was unable to say directly that they had been broken into, 
or even that they could not have been empty before the 
alleged theft. He testified that he returned to the 
laundry and during the next few days counted the money in 
the other machines to determine how much might have been 
in the machines that were found empty. Such a procedure 
is riddled with inaccuracies and vagueness, since the 
laundry was open during those days and the other machines 
were presumably constantly taking in more money. Further, 
the owner admitted that he could not say when was the last 
time he emptied the machines in question, nor had he kept, 
prior to the alleged theft, records of the all.cunt of the 
proceeds produced by any particular machine. He could 
not even testify that all the machines were regularly or 
periodically emptied at the same time, or that they pro-
duced the same amount of proceeds regularly. In fact, he 
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testified that the machines were of varying sizes and 
capacities, as concerning the amount of change which th~ 
i 
would hold. He testified also that he had a practice of 
emptying some of the machines occasionally, leaving the 
others, in order to obtain change to put in the dollar-
bill changer; and he could not and did not testify that 
this may not have been why the suspected machines were 
empty. 
In short, the kind of testimony introduced as to 
the value of the property allegedly taken was complete~ 
unrelated to that value, in the same sense that replace-
ment or original costs are unrelated to fair market val~ 
In light of the established rules requiring that methods 
of valuation be precise and avoid the possibility of mi~ 
leading the jury, the method of valuation used by the 
State's witness here, and upon which his testimony was 
based, was unacceptable. Since the methods used by the 
owner of the laundry to determine the value of the propm 
taken did not bear the necessary reliability and did not 
on their face appear to arrive at a substantial equival5 
of the actual value of the property taken, under the 
circumstances, the evidence offered on the issue of val~ 
was irrelevant and inadmissible, and presented a serious 
danger that the jury would be misled on the issue of 
valuation. The failure of ilieDistrict Court to grant t~ 
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appellants' motions for dismissal and judgment notwith-
standing the verdict was therefore prejudicial error and 
requires reversal. 
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